Life and Death.
I defend a definition of death applicable to organisms, and their relevant proper parts, accommodating the possibility that such entities, when in a state of suspended animation, are bereft of life-processes, but not dead. Further, I defend a definition of life, utilizing the notion of a goal-direct...
| Publicado en: | Monist Vol. 98; no. 3; pp. 303 - 318 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Sep2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=110246074&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 110246074 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00269662 MST jtl: Monist issn: 00269662 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2015 vid: 98 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 110246074 10.1093/monist/onv011 ppf: 303 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 554KB tig: atl: Life and Death. aug: au: Rosenkrantz, Gary S. affil: University of North Carolina, Greensboro su: Death Life Philosophy Ontology Organisms sug: subj: Death Life Philosophy Ontology Organisms ab: I defend a definition of death applicable to organisms, and their relevant proper parts, accommodating the possibility that such entities, when in a state of suspended animation, are bereft of life-processes, but not dead. Further, I defend a definition of life, utilizing the notion of a goal-directed metabolic, reproductive, or psychological activity, that can accommodate living things of any possible natural kind or ontological category, e.g., living organisms (whether carbon-based or otherwise), their living cells, living persons of any metaphysically possible sort, such as living humans, reflective androids, and nonphysical souls. I remain neutral about whether instances of such natural kinds would necessarily instantiate them and about whether goal-directedness of the aforementioned kind is reducible to natural selection and inheritance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Hegeler Institute. item: Monist holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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