A Pluralist View about Information.
Focusing on Shannon information, this article shows that, even on the basis of the same formalism, there may be different interpretations of the concept of information, and that disagreements may be deep enough to lead to very different conclusions about the informational characterization of certain...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 82; no. 5; pp. 1248 - 1260 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Dec2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Focusing on Shannon information, this article shows that, even on the basis of the same formalism, there may be different interpretations of the concept of information, and that disagreements may be deep enough to lead to very different conclusions about the informational characterization of certain physical situations. On this basis, a pluralist view is argued for, according to which the concept of information is primarily a formal concept that can adopt different interpretations that are not mutually exclusive, but each useful in a different specific context. |
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