A Pluralist View about Information.

Focusing on Shannon information, this article shows that, even on the basis of the same formalism, there may be different interpretations of the concept of information, and that disagreements may be deep enough to lead to very different conclusions about the informational characterization of certain...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 82; no. 5; pp. 1248 - 1260
Autores principales: Lombardi, Olimpia, Fortin, Sebastian, Vanni, Leonardo
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2015
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: A Pluralist View about Information.
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          Lombardi, Olimpia
          Fortin, Sebastian
          Vanni, Leonardo
      su:
        Information theory
        Pluralism
        Concepts
        Theory of knowledge
        Philosophy of physics
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          Information theory
          Pluralism
          Concepts
          Theory of knowledge
          Philosophy of physics
      ab: Focusing on Shannon information, this article shows that, even on the basis of the same formalism, there may be different interpretations of the concept of information, and that disagreements may be deep enough to lead to very different conclusions about the informational characterization of certain physical situations. On this basis, a pluralist view is argued for, according to which the concept of information is primarily a formal concept that can adopt different interpretations that are not mutually exclusive, but each useful in a different specific context.
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