In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.

I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which "plays it safe." Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:	Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 1; pp. 29 - 60
Autor principal:	Vanderschraaf, Peter
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Cambridge University Press Jan2016
Materias:	Optimality theory (Linguistics) Philosophy of punishment Coordinate constructions (Linguistics) Social science research Public goods
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost

Descripción
Sumario:	I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which "plays it safe." Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy ESS. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support to the altruistic punishment hypothesis in the social sciences.