In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option.
I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which "plays it safe." Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 1; pp. 29 - 60 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2016
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=111750155&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 111750155 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2016 vid: 83 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 111750155 10.1086/684166 ppf: 29 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2.3MB tig: atl: In a Weakly Dominated Strategy Is Strength: Evolution of Optimality in Stag Hunt Augmented with a Punishment Option. aug: au: Vanderschraaf, Peter su: Optimality theory (Linguistics) Philosophy of punishment Coordinate constructions (Linguistics) Social science research Public goods sug: subj: Optimality theory (Linguistics) Philosophy of punishment Coordinate constructions (Linguistics) Social science research Public goods ab: I explore the evolution of strategies in an Augmented Stag Hunt game that adds a punishing strategy to the ordinary Stag Hunt strategies of cooperating, which aims for optimality, and defecting, which "plays it safe." Cooperating weakly dominates punishing and defecting is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy ESS. Nevertheless, for a wide class of Augmented Stag Hunts, polymorphic strategies combining punishing and cooperating collectively have greater attracting power for replicator dynamics than that of the ESS. The analysis here lends theoretical support to the altruistic punishment hypothesis in the social sciences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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