Refuting Modern Psychological Claims against Free Will.
Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will argues against free will from a psychological-philosophical perspective. This paper refutes his arguments and demonstrates that complete determinism in human behavior is unprovable though not implausible. The paper proposes a theory of free will that ac...
| Publicado en: | Dialogue (00122246) Vol. 57; no. 2/3; pp. 145 - 152 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Phi Sigma Tau
Apr2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will argues against free will from a psychological-philosophical perspective. This paper refutes his arguments and demonstrates that complete determinism in human behavior is unprovable though not implausible. The paper proposes a theory of free will that accommodates Wegner's evidence for determinism, showing that free will is equally plausible. Finally, the paper gives an example of how this theory of free will, which depends on occasional, truly free "impossible decisions," might apply to an ancient story. |
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