Refuting Modern Psychological Claims against Free Will.

Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will argues against free will from a psychological-philosophical perspective. This paper refutes his arguments and demonstrates that complete determinism in human behavior is unprovable though not implausible. The paper proposes a theory of free will that ac...

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Publicado en:Dialogue (00122246) Vol. 57; no. 2/3; pp. 145 - 152
Autor principal: Collier, Abraham
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Phi Sigma Tau Apr2015
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Free will & determinism
        Determinism (Philosophy)
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          Free will & determinism
          Determinism (Philosophy)
      ab: Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will argues against free will from a psychological-philosophical perspective. This paper refutes his arguments and demonstrates that complete determinism in human behavior is unprovable though not implausible. The paper proposes a theory of free will that accommodates Wegner's evidence for determinism, showing that free will is equally plausible. Finally, the paper gives an example of how this theory of free will, which depends on occasional, truly free "impossible decisions," might apply to an ancient story.
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