Online advertising and privacy.
An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ in their preferences. Prior to the auction, the platform decides whether to allow advertisers to access information about consumers (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves the...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 47; no. 1; pp. 48 - 73 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=112192210&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 112192210 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2016 vid: 47 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 112192210 10.1111/1756-2171.12118 ppf: 48 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 587KB tig: atl: Online advertising and privacy. aug: au: de Cornière, Alexandre de Nijs, Romain affil: Toulouse School of Economics Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole des Ponts ParisTech su: Data privacy Consumer preferences Disclosure Internet advertising Internet auctions sug: subj: Data privacy Consumer preferences Disclosure Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals Advertising Agencies Electronic shopping and mail-order houses Electronic Auctions Internet advertising Internet auctions ab: An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ in their preferences. Prior to the auction, the platform decides whether to allow advertisers to access information about consumers (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves the match between advertisers and consumers but increases product prices, even without price-discrimination. We provide conditions under which disclosure or privacy is privately and/or socially optimal. When advertisers compete on the downstream market, disclosure can lead to an increase or a decrease in product prices depending on the nature of the information. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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