Epistemic "Holes" in Space-Time.
A number of models of general relativity seem to contain "holes" that are thought to be "physically unreasonable." One seeks a condition to rule out these models. We examine a number of possibilities already in use. We then introduce a new condition: epistemic hole-freeness. Epistemic hole-freeness...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 2; pp. 265 - 277 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Apr2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | A number of models of general relativity seem to contain "holes" that are thought to be "physically unreasonable." One seeks a condition to rule out these models. We examine a number of possibilities already in use. We then introduce a new condition: epistemic hole-freeness. Epistemic hole-freeness is not just a new condition--it is new in kind. In particular, it does not presuppose a distinction between space-times that are "physically reasonable" and those that are not. |
|---|