Epistemic "Holes" in Space-Time.
A number of models of general relativity seem to contain "holes" that are thought to be "physically unreasonable." One seeks a condition to rule out these models. We examine a number of possibilities already in use. We then introduce a new condition: epistemic hole-freeness. Epistemic hole-freeness...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 2; pp. 265 - 277 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Apr2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=113658917&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 113658917 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2016 vid: 83 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 113658917 10.1086/684913 ppf: 265 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 520KB tig: atl: Epistemic "Holes" in Space-Time. aug: au: Manchak, John Byron su: Epistemics Spacetime General relativity (Physics) Possibility Presupposition (Logic) sug: subj: Epistemics Spacetime General relativity (Physics) Possibility Presupposition (Logic) ab: A number of models of general relativity seem to contain "holes" that are thought to be "physically unreasonable." One seeks a condition to rule out these models. We examine a number of possibilities already in use. We then introduce a new condition: epistemic hole-freeness. Epistemic hole-freeness is not just a new condition--it is new in kind. In particular, it does not presuppose a distinction between space-times that are "physically reasonable" and those that are not. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|