Serious theories and skeptical theories: Why you are probably not a brain in a vat.
Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayes...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 4; pp. 1031 - 1053 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfied. |
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