Serious theories and skeptical theories: Why you are probably not a brain in a vat.

Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayes...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 4; pp. 1031 - 1053
Autor principal: Huemer, Michael
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Huemer, Michael
        affil: Philosophy Department, CB 232, University of Colorado, Boulder 80309-0232 USA
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        Evidence
        Logical prediction
        Judgment (Logic)
        Theory of knowledge
        Philosophical research
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          Evidence
          Logical prediction
          Judgment (Logic)
          Theory of knowledge
          Philosophical research
      keyword:
        Bayesianism
        Brain in a vat
        Cartesian skepticism
        Skepticism
      ab: Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfied.
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