Does the Excess Entry Theorem Hold in a Differentiated Oligopoly?
Though it is generally believed that increasing competition improves social welfare, we are able to show with a Shubik- Levitan demand function for differentiated goods that this is not always the case. Under Cournot and Bertrand competition, market entry increases the equilibrium total output and l...
| Publicado en: | Manchester School (1463-6786) Vol. 84; no. 3; pp. 340 - 363 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=114191398&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 114191398 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 14636786 MSE jtl: Manchester School (1463-6786) issn: 14636786 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2016 vid: 84 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 114191398 10.1111/manc.12104 ppf: 340 ppct: 23 formats: tig: atl: Does the Excess Entry Theorem Hold in a Differentiated Oligopoly? aug: au: Kagitani, Koichi Ohkawa, Takao Okamura, Makoto affil: Department of International Relations, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University Economics Department, Hiroshima University su: Market entry Economic competition Social services Consumers' surplus Marginal utility sug: subj: Market entry Economic competition Social services Other Individual and Family Services Consumers' surplus Marginal utility ab: Though it is generally believed that increasing competition improves social welfare, we are able to show with a Shubik- Levitan demand function for differentiated goods that this is not always the case. Under Cournot and Bertrand competition, market entry increases the equilibrium total output and lowers the equilibrium price in the case of substitutes, but it reduces the total output and raises the price in the case of complements. In the long run, the equilibrium number of firms is excessive and the equilibrium cannot achieve even the second-best social welfare under either type of competition, regardless of product substitutability or complementarity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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