Does the Excess Entry Theorem Hold in a Differentiated Oligopoly?

Though it is generally believed that increasing competition improves social welfare, we are able to show with a Shubik- Levitan demand function for differentiated goods that this is not always the case. Under Cournot and Bertrand competition, market entry increases the equilibrium total output and l...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Manchester School (1463-6786) Vol. 84; no. 3; pp. 340 - 363
Autores principales:	Kagitani, Koichi, Ohkawa, Takao, Okamura, Makoto
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Jun2016
Materias:	Market entry Economic competition Social services Consumers' surplus Marginal utility
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost