Conservatism and Uniqueness.
Credal Conservatism says that an agent's credal states should be conserved as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness says that for any given total evidence, there is a unique credal state that any agent with that total evidence should have. Epistemic Impartiality is the...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 8; pp. 2233 - 2249 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Aug2016
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Credal Conservatism says that an agent's credal states should be conserved as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness says that for any given total evidence, there is a unique credal state that any agent with that total evidence should have. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that there are no significant differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements when determining what credal states one ought to have for purposes of epistemic evaluation. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-principle governing epistemic norms, and argue that it is compatible with Conservatism. Then I show that on the assumption of Epistemic Impartiality, Credal Conservatism is equivalent to Uniqueness. |
|---|