Learning Disability and the Extended Mind.
In his critique of the extended mind hypothesis, Robert Rupert suggests that we have no reason to move from the claim that cognition is deeply embedded in the environment to the more radical claim that, in some cases, cognition itself extends into the environment. In this paper, I argue that we have...
| Publicado en: | Essays in Philosophy Vol. 17; no. 2; pp. 38 - 69 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Essays in Philosophy
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=117791467&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 117791467 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15260569 1CNX jtl: Essays in Philosophy issn: 15260569 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2016 vid: 17 iid: 2 pid: 24375 pub: Essays in Philosophy artinfo: ui: 117791467 10.7710/1526-0569.1556 ppf: 38 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 3.3MB tig: atl: Learning Disability and the Extended Mind. aug: au: King, Caroline affil: University of Arizona su: Learning disabilities Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Rupert, Robert sug: subj: Learning disabilities Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Rupert, Robert ab: In his critique of the extended mind hypothesis, Robert Rupert suggests that we have no reason to move from the claim that cognition is deeply embedded in the environment to the more radical claim that, in some cases, cognition itself extends into the environment. In this paper, I argue that we have strong normative reasons to prefer the more radical extended mind hypothesis to Rupert's modest embedded mind hypothesis. I take an agnostic position on the metaphysical debate about the ultimate nature and location of the mind, and instead argue in favor of the extended mind framework on the basis of its ability to better capture normative concerns about the way we evaluate the cognitive capacities of learning disabled individuals. In light of the commitments of the embedded and extended mind frameworks, defenders of the embedded mind framework are committed to conclusions about learning-disabled individuals that we have good normative reason to reject, whereas the extended mind framework avoids such problematic conclusions. Thus, if we find these normative concerns persuasive, we have good reason to prefer the extended mind position. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Essays in Philosophy is the property of Essays in Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Essays in Philosophy holder: Essays in Philosophy dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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