Why Peirce’s Anti-Intuitionism is not Anti-Cartesian: The Diagnosis of a Pragmatist Dogma.
A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly hisRegulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conc...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 489 - 508 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly hisRegulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conception of intuition differs from Peirce’s, and on one plausible reading of Descartes his intuitionism actually mirrors Peirce’s inferentialism in key respects. Given these similarities between Descartes and Peirce, the dogmatic status of the anti-Cartesian interpretation of Peirce becomes evident. |
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