Why Peirce’s Anti-Intuitionism is not Anti-Cartesian: The Diagnosis of a Pragmatist Dogma.

A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly hisRegulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conc...

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Publicado en:International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 489 - 508
Autor principal: Dabay, Thomas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Oct2016
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Why Peirce’s Anti-Intuitionism is not Anti-Cartesian: The Diagnosis of a Pragmatist Dogma.
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        au: Dabay, Thomas
        affil: Philosophy Department, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA
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        Ethical intuitionism
        Ethics
        Intuition
        Modern ethics
        Cartesianism (Philosophy)
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          Ethical intuitionism
          Ethics
          Intuition
          Modern ethics
          Cartesianism (Philosophy)
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        Descartes
        inference
        intuition
        Peirce
        pragmatism
      ab: A close reading of Descartes’ works, particularly hisRegulae ad Directionem Ingenii, calls into question the common interpretation of Peirce’s ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ and ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ as being anti-Cartesian. In particular, Descartes’ conception of intuition differs from Peirce’s, and on one plausible reading of Descartes his intuitionism actually mirrors Peirce’s inferentialism in key respects. Given these similarities between Descartes and Peirce, the dogmatic status of the anti-Cartesian interpretation of Peirce becomes evident.
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