Cover Image
QR Code

Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.

I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the 'knowledge-action principle' are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclu...

Full description

Published in:Philosophical Studies Vol. 173; no. 10; pp. 2745 - 2758
Main Author: Zweber, Adam
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Oct2016
Subjects:
Fallibilism
Theory of knowledge
Pragmatics
Inconsistency (Logic)
Fantl, Jeremy
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
Summary:I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the 'knowledge-action principle' are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.