Unconscious Evidence.
Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cann...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 243 - 263 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=118989491&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 118989491 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2016 vid: 26 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 118989491 10.1111/phis.12073 ppf: 243 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 126KB tig: atl: Unconscious Evidence. aug: au: Lyons, Jack affil: University of Arkansas su: Belief & doubt Subconsciousness Problem solving Epistemic logic Distinction (Philosophy) sug: subj: Belief & doubt Subconsciousness Problem solving Epistemic logic Distinction (Philosophy) ab: Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person-level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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