Unconscious Evidence.
Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cann...
| Published in: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 243 - 263 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2016
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person-level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems. |
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