Moral Individualism and Relationalism: a Narrative-Style Philosophical Challenge.
Morally unequal treatment of different nonhuman species, like pigs and dogs, can seem troublingly inconsistent. A position Todd May calls moral individualism and relationalism appears to justify the moral discomfit attending such species-differentiated treatment. Yet some of its basic assumptions ar...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 19; no. 5; pp. 1241 - 1258 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=119139916&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 119139916 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2016 vid: 19 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 119139916 10.1007/s10677-016-9734-5 ppf: 1241 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 365KB tig: atl: Moral Individualism and Relationalism: a Narrative-Style Philosophical Challenge. aug: au: Coghlan, Simon affil: Philosophy Department , Australian Catholic University , Melbourne Australia su: Individualism Relationism Reductionism Animal welfare & ethics Human-animal relationships Ethics sug: subj: Individualism Relationism Reductionism Animal welfare & ethics Human-animal relationships Ethics keyword: Cora Diamond Moral consistency Moral individualism Moral relevance Narrative philosophy Nonhuman animals Raimond Gaita Relationalism Todd May ab: Morally unequal treatment of different nonhuman species, like pigs and dogs, can seem troublingly inconsistent. A position Todd May calls moral individualism and relationalism appears to justify the moral discomfit attending such species-differentiated treatment. Yet some of its basic assumptions are challenged by a philosophical style Roger Scruton called narrative philosophy. Expanding upon Christopher Cordner's discussion of narrative philosophy, this paper develops a narrative-style philosophical critique of Todd May's moral individualism and relationalism, especially its reductionist understanding of moral reasons, consistency, and relevance. Such criticism opens up the possibility that the unequal treatment of nonhuman species like pigs and dogs is perfectly consistent and even justified. However, the paper then presents a narrative-style argument that such species-differentiated treatment may be morally inconsistent and unjustified after all. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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