Horizontal mergers and divestment dynamics in a sunset industry.

Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business-stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business-stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers i...

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Published in:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 961 - 998
Main Author: Nishiwaki, Masato
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Winter2016
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Horizontal mergers and divestment dynamics in a sunset industry.
      aug:
        au: Nishiwaki, Masato
        affil: Waseda University
      su:
        Welfare economics
        Horizontal merger
        Consumers' surplus
        Corporate divestiture
        Cement industries
      sug:
        subj:
          Welfare economics
          Cement Manufacturing
          Other specialty-line building supplies merchant wholesalers
          Horizontal merger
          Consumers' surplus
          Corporate divestiture
          Cement industries
      ab: Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business-stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business-stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers in the Japanese cement industry, it examines whether such merger-induced divestment improves total welfare based on a dynamic model of divestment. The findings suggest that merged firms indeed tended to reduce capital more actively and that, as a result of these mergers, total welfare improved despite a reduction in the consumer surplus.
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      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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