Horizontal mergers and divestment dynamics in a sunset industry.

Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business-stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business-stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 961 - 998
Main Author: Nishiwaki, Masato
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Winter2016
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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Summary:Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business-stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business-stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers in the Japanese cement industry, it examines whether such merger-induced divestment improves total welfare based on a dynamic model of divestment. The findings suggest that merged firms indeed tended to reduce capital more actively and that, as a result of these mergers, total welfare improved despite a reduction in the consumer surplus.