Missing the Forest for the Fish: How Much Does the ‘Hawkmoth Effect’ Threaten the Viability of Climate Projections?
Roman Frigg and others have developed a general epistemological argument designed to cast doubt on the capacity of a broad range of mathematical models (including many climate models) to generate “decision relevant predictions.” In this article, we lay out the structure of their argument—an argument...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 83; no. 5; pp. 1122 - 1133 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2016
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Roman Frigg and others have developed a general epistemological argument designed to cast doubt on the capacity of a broad range of mathematical models (including many climate models) to generate “decision relevant predictions.” In this article, we lay out the structure of their argument—an argument by analogy—with an eye to identifying points at which certain epistemically significant distinctions might limit the force of the analogy. Finally, some of these epistemically significant distinctions are introduced and defended as relevant to a great many of the predictive mathematical modeling projects employed in contemporary climate science. |
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