MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS.
We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry de...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 55; no. 1; pp. 319 - 339 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=119533462&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 119533462 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2017 vid: 55 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 119533462 10.1111/ecin.12381 ppf: 319 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 363KB tig: atl: MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS. aug: au: Ciliberto, Federico Zhang, Zhou affil: Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville VA 22904 Seattle, WA su: United States Economic equilibrium Airline industry Carriers Airline industry & economics Economic research sug: subj: Economic equilibrium United States Scheduled air transportation Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities Airline industry Carriers Airline industry & economics Economic research ab: We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry deterrence. In a sequential game with entry deterrence, an incumbent decides whether to incur a cost to deter potential entrants. We show that the model with sequential games with strategic deterrence provides the best fit to the data. We conclude that the results reject the hypothesis of a static model and support the hypothesis of the existence of strategic entry deterrence. ( JEL L1) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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