MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS.

We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry de...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 55; no. 1; pp. 319 - 339
Autores principales:	Ciliberto, Federico, Zhang, Zhou
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Jan2017
Materias:	United States Economic equilibrium Airline industry Carriers Airline industry & economics Economic research
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost