Rethinking associations in psychology.
I challenge the dominant understanding of what it means to say two thoughts are associated. The two views that dominate the current literature treat association as a kind of mechanism that drives sequences of thought (often implicitly treating them so). The first, which I call reductive associationi...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 193; no. 12; pp. 3763 - 3787 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=119806954&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 119806954 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2016 vid: 193 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 119806954 10.1007/s11229-016-1167-0 ppf: 3763 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 512KB tig: atl: Rethinking associations in psychology. aug: au: Dacey, Mike affil: Washington University in St. Louis , Campus Box 1073, One Brookings Drive St. Louis 63130 USA su: Comparative psychology Models & modelmaking Mechanism (Philosophy) Connectionism Reductionism sug: subj: Comparative psychology Models & modelmaking Mechanism (Philosophy) Connectionism Reductionism keyword: Associationism Mechanism Modelling ab: I challenge the dominant understanding of what it means to say two thoughts are associated. The two views that dominate the current literature treat association as a kind of mechanism that drives sequences of thought (often implicitly treating them so). The first, which I call reductive associationism, treats association as a kind of neural mechanism. The second treats association as a feature of the kind of psychological mechanism associative processing. Both of these views are inadequate. I argue that association should instead be seen as a highly abstract filler term, standing in for causal relations between representational states in a system. Associations, so viewed, could be implemented by many different mechanisms. I outline the role that this view gives associative models as part of a top-down characterization of psychological processes of any kind and of any complexity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2016. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2016 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|