Intuition and Reason: Re-Assessing Dual-Process Theories with Representational Sub-Activation.
There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rulebased, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in fav...
| Publicado en: | Teorema Vol. 34; no. 3; pp. 197 - 220 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Teorema
Autumn2015
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=120363233&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 120363233 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02101602 IHG jtl: Teorema issn: 02101602 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Autumn2015 vid: 34 iid: 3 pid: 20677 pub: Teorema artinfo: ui: 120363233 ppf: 197 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.4MB tig: atl: Intuition and Reason: Re-Assessing Dual-Process Theories with Representational Sub-Activation. aug: au: Trafford, James Tillas, Alexandros affil: Department of Humanities, University for the Creative Arts, 21 Ashely Rd., Epson KT18 5BE, UK. Institut für Philosophie, Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Universitätsstr. 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany. su: Intuition Reason Cognitive bias Attention Cognition sug: subj: Intuition Reason Cognitive bias Attention Cognition keyword: Cognitive Biases Cognitive Debiasing Dual-Process Theories Intuitions Reasoning Representational Networks atención corrección de sesgos intuiciones razonamiento redes representacionales sesgos cognitivos teorías del proceso dual ab: There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rulebased, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in favour of a unitary cognitive system. More specifically, we suggest that intuitions (T1-processes) are sub-activated representations, which are in turn influenced by the weightings of the connections between different representations. Furthermore, we explain biases by appealing to the role of attention in thinking processes. The suggested view explains reasoning and bias whilst dealing with extant problems facing dual-process accounts. En la literatura sobre el razonamiento prevalece una distinción entre los procesos tipo-1 (rápidos, automáticos, asociativos, heurísticos e intuitivos) y los procesos tipo-2 (basados en reglas, analíticos y reflexivos). En este artículo, apoyamos la evidencia empírica reciente [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] a favor de un sistema cognitivo único. En concreto, proponemos que las intuiciones (procesos tipo-1) son representaciones subactivadas, influenciadas a su vez por los pesos de las conexiones entre distintas representaciones. Asimismo, explicamos los sesgos mediante el papel de la atención en los procesos de pensamiento. Así, nuestra propuesta explica el razonamiento y el sesgo, a la vez que soluciona algunos de los problemas a los que se enfrentan las explicaciones basadas en procesos duales. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Teorema is the property of Teorema and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Teorema holder: Teorema dt: @attributes: year: 2015 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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