Intuition and Reason: Re-Assessing Dual-Process Theories with Representational Sub-Activation.

There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rulebased, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in fav...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Teorema Vol. 34; no. 3; pp. 197 - 220
Main Authors:	Trafford, James, Tillas, Alexandros
Format:	Article
Published:	Teorema Autumn2015
Subjects:	Intuition Reason Cognitive bias Attention Cognition
Online Access:	View this record in EBSCOhost

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Summary:	There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rulebased, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in favour of a unitary cognitive system. More specifically, we suggest that intuitions (T1-processes) are sub-activated representations, which are in turn influenced by the weightings of the connections between different representations. Furthermore, we explain biases by appealing to the role of attention in thinking processes. The suggested view explains reasoning and bias whilst dealing with extant problems facing dual-process accounts. En la literatura sobre el razonamiento prevalece una distinción entre los procesos tipo-1 (rápidos, automáticos, asociativos, heurísticos e intuitivos) y los procesos tipo-2 (basados en reglas, analíticos y reflexivos). En este artículo, apoyamos la evidencia empírica reciente [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] a favor de un sistema cognitivo único. En concreto, proponemos que las intuiciones (procesos tipo-1) son representaciones subactivadas, influenciadas a su vez por los pesos de las conexiones entre distintas representaciones. Asimismo, explicamos los sesgos mediante el papel de la atención en los procesos de pensamiento. Así, nuestra propuesta explica el razonamiento y el sesgo, a la vez que soluciona algunos de los problemas a los que se enfrentan las explicaciones basadas en procesos duales.