Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition.

We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. Second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Journal of Political Economy Vol. 125; no. 1; pp. 69 - 99
Autores principales:	Ashlagi, Itai, Kanoria, Yash, Leshno, Jacob D.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	University of Chicago Press Feb2017
Materias:	Economic competition Stark effect Atoms in external electric fields Ubiquitous computing Distributed computing
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost