Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition.
We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. Second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 125; no. 1; pp. 69 - 99 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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University of Chicago Press
Feb2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=120762698&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 120762698 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2017 vid: 125 iid: 1 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 120762698 10.1086/689869 ppf: 69 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: The Stark Effect of Competition. aug: au: Ashlagi, Itai Kanoria, Yash Leshno, Jacob D. affil: Stanford University Columbia University su: Economic competition Stark effect Atoms in external electric fields Ubiquitous computing Distributed computing sug: subj: Economic competition Stark effect Atoms in external electric fields Ubiquitous computing Distributed computing ab: We study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. First, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. Second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching markets are extremely competitive. Each agent on the short side of the market is matched with one of his top choices, and each agent on the long side either is unmatched or does almost no better than being matched with a random partner. Our results suggest that any matching market is likely to have a small core, explaining why small cores are empirically ubiquitous. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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