Collusion and heterogeneity of firms.

We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average disco...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 48; no. 1; pp. 230 - 250
Autores principales:	Obara, Ichiro, Zincenko, Federico
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Spring2017
Materias:	Game theory Price fixing Discount prices Mathematical models of economic competition Market share Profitability
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost