Collusion and heterogeneity of firms.
We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average disco...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 48; no. 1; pp. 230 - 250 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=121147679&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 121147679 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2017 vid: 48 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 121147679 10.1111/1756-2171.12174 ppf: 230 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 203KB tig: atl: Collusion and heterogeneity of firms. aug: au: Obara, Ichiro Zincenko, Federico affil: University of California, Los Angeles University of Pittsburgh su: Game theory Price fixing Discount prices Mathematical models of economic competition Market share Profitability sug: subj: Game theory Price fixing Discount prices Mathematical models of economic competition Market share Profitability ab: We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, with or without capacity constraints. Next, we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long-run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria. In the long run, the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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