Einstein Algebras and the Hole Argument.
Einstein algebras have been suggested (Earman 1989) and rejected (Rynasiewicz 1992) as a way to avoid the hole argument against spacetime substantivalism. In this article, I debate their merits and faults. In particular, I suggest that a gauge-invariant interpretation of Einstein algebras that avoid...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1073 - 1086 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Einstein algebras have been suggested (Earman 1989) and rejected (Rynasiewicz 1992) as a way to avoid the hole argument against spacetime substantivalism. In this article, I debate their merits and faults. In particular, I suggest that a gauge-invariant interpretation of Einstein algebras that avoids the hole argument can be associated with one approach to quantizing gravity, and, for this reason, is at least as well motivated as sophisticated substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of the standard tensor formalism. |
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