Einstein Algebras and the Hole Argument.
Einstein algebras have been suggested (Earman 1989) and rejected (Rynasiewicz 1992) as a way to avoid the hole argument against spacetime substantivalism. In this article, I debate their merits and faults. In particular, I suggest that a gauge-invariant interpretation of Einstein algebras that avoid...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1073 - 1086 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=12413889&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 12413889 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2003 vid: 70 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 12413889 10.1086/377390 ppf: 1073 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 114KB tig: atl: Einstein Algebras and the Hole Argument. aug: au: Bain, Jonathan su: Algebra General relativity (Physics) Einstein field equations Einstein manifolds Homomorphisms Mathematical analysis sug: subj: Algebra General relativity (Physics) Einstein field equations Einstein manifolds Homomorphisms Mathematical analysis ab: Einstein algebras have been suggested (Earman 1989) and rejected (Rynasiewicz 1992) as a way to avoid the hole argument against spacetime substantivalism. In this article, I debate their merits and faults. In particular, I suggest that a gauge-invariant interpretation of Einstein algebras that avoids the hole argument can be associated with one approach to quantizing gravity, and, for this reason, is at least as well motivated as sophisticated substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of the standard tensor formalism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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