Defending Conventions as Functionally a Priori Knowledge.
Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct—some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1149 - 1161 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct—some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated. |
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