Defending Conventions as Functionally a Priori Knowledge.
Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct—some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1149 - 1161 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2003
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=12413917&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 12413917 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2003 vid: 70 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 12413917 10.1086/377396 ppf: 1149 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 92KB tig: atl: Defending Conventions as Functionally a Priori Knowledge. aug: au: Stump, David J. su: A priori Theory of knowledge Holism Empiricism Vienna circle General relativity (Physics) Poincaré series sug: subj: A priori Theory of knowledge Holism Empiricism Vienna circle General relativity (Physics) Poincaré series ab: Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct—some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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