On the Metaphysics of Probabilistic Causation: Lessons from Social Epidemiology.

I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 70; no. 5; pp. 1413 - 1424
Main Author: Glymour, Bruce
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Dec2003
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
Description
Summary:I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populations can cause the behavior of members of the populations. Such emergent population-level causation is metaphysically impossible on the orthodoxy.