Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses.
The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail-pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue-sha...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 48; no. 3; pp. 673 - 704 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Fall2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=124623593&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 124623593 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Fall2017 vid: 48 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 124623593 10.1111/1756-2171.12195 ppf: 673 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 501KB tig: atl: Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses. aug: au: Foros, Øystein Kind, Hans Jarle Shaffer, Greg affil: NHH Norwegian School of Economics NHH Norwegian School of Economics and CESifo University of Rochester su: Apple Inc. Consumer attitudes Mathematical models of pricing Revenue sharing (Corporations) Corporate profits sug: subj: Consumer attitudes Apple Inc. Mathematical models of pricing Revenue sharing (Corporations) Corporate profits ab: The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail-pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue-sharing splits and the degrees to which consumers view the platforms and the goods sold on the platforms to be substitutes. We show that the agency model may not be universally adopted even if adoption would mean higher profits for all firms. Use of most-favored-nation clauses in these settings can ensure industry-wide adoption and increase retail prices. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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