Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses.

The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail-pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue-sha...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 48; no. 3; pp. 673 - 704
Autores principales:	Foros, Øystein, Kind, Hans Jarle, Shaffer, Greg
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Fall2017
Materias:	Apple Inc. Consumer attitudes Mathematical models of pricing Revenue sharing (Corporations) Corporate profits
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost