Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties.

Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	American Economic Review Vol. 107; no. 9; pp. 2666 - 2695
Autores principales:	Mylovanov, Tymofiy, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	American Economic Association Sep2017
Materias:	Social values Resource allocation > Mathematical models Agency theory Fines (Penalties) Prizes (Contests & competitions) False claims Organizational finance
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost