Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties.
Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 107; no. 9; pp. 2666 - 2695 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
American Economic Association
Sep2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=124972988&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 124972988 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2017 vid: 107 iid: 9 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 124972988 10.1257/aer.20140494 ppf: 2666 ppct: 29 formats: tig: atl: Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties. aug: au: Mylovanov, Tymofiy Zapechelnyuk, Andriy affil: Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4925 Posvar Hall, 230 South Bouquet Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine, and Council of the National Bank of Ukraine (email: ) School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Castlecliffe, the Scores, St. Andrews KY16 9AR, UK (email: ) su: Social values Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Agency theory Fines (Penalties) Prizes (Contests & competitions) False claims Organizational finance sug: subj: Social values Other Similar Organizations (except Business, Professional, Labor, and Political Organizations) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Agency theory Fines (Penalties) Prizes (Contests & competitions) False claims Organizational finance ab: Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below. (JEL D63, D82) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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