Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity: Sartre's Implicit Argument for the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject.
I address the problem of what grounds Sartre's paradoxical claim that consciousness is non-self-identical, and his equally paradoxical gloss on that claim--that the nature of consciousness is to be what it is not and not to be what it is. I argue that there is an implicit argument in Being and Nothi...
| Publicado en: | Sartre Studies International Vol. 23; no. 2; pp. 98 - 114 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Berghahn Books
2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |