Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity: Sartre's Implicit Argument for the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject.
I address the problem of what grounds Sartre's paradoxical claim that consciousness is non-self-identical, and his equally paradoxical gloss on that claim--that the nature of consciousness is to be what it is not and not to be what it is. I argue that there is an implicit argument in Being and Nothi...
| Publicado en: | Sartre Studies International Vol. 23; no. 2; pp. 98 - 114 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Berghahn Books
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=125927778&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 125927778 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13571559 QM6 jtl: Sartre Studies International issn: 13571559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2017 vid: 23 iid: 2 pid: 1130 pub: Berghahn Books artinfo: ui: 125927778 10.3167/ssi.2017.230207 ppf: 98 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 410KB tig: atl: Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity: Sartre's Implicit Argument for the Non-Self-Identity of the Subject. aug: au: JORDAN, MAIYA affil: PhD student at McGill University su: Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980 Being & Nothingness (Book : Sartre) Self-consciousness (Awareness) Identity (Philosophical concept) Theorists sug: subj: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Identity (Philosophical concept) Theorists Being & Nothingness (Book : Sartre) Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1905-1980 keyword: identity iteration pre-reflection self-consciousness translucency identity iteration pre-reflection self-consciousness translucency ab: I address the problem of what grounds Sartre's paradoxical claim that consciousness is non-self-identical, and his equally paradoxical gloss on that claim--that the nature of consciousness is to be what it is not and not to be what it is. I argue that there is an implicit argument in Being and Nothingness, which both entails and elucidates Sartre's claim that consciousness is non-self-identical, and which also maps on to, and clarifies, the explicit argument that Sartre provides for this conclusion. This implicit argument presupposes that we attribute to Sartre a distinctive theory of pre-reflective self-consciousness--what I call the non-iterative theory. I argue that we should attribute the non-iterative theory to Sartre. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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