On (not) defining cognition.
Should cognitive scientists be any more embarrassed about their lack of a discipline-fixing definition of cognition than biologists are about their inability to define 'life'? My answer is 'no'. Philosophers seeking a unique 'mark of the cognitive' or less onerous but nevertheless categorical charac...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 194; no. 11; pp. 4233 - 4250 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Should cognitive scientists be any more embarrassed about their lack of a discipline-fixing definition of cognition than biologists are about their inability to define 'life'? My answer is 'no'. Philosophers seeking a unique 'mark of the cognitive' or less onerous but nevertheless categorical characterizations of cognition are working at a level of analysis upon which hangs nothing that either cognitive scientists or philosophers of cognitive science should care about. In contrast, I advocate a pluralistic stance towards uses of the term 'cognition' that eschews the urge to treat cognition as a metaphysically well-defined 'natural' kind. |
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