On (not) defining cognition.

Should cognitive scientists be any more embarrassed about their lack of a discipline-fixing definition of cognition than biologists are about their inability to define 'life'? My answer is 'no'. Philosophers seeking a unique 'mark of the cognitive' or less onerous but nevertheless categorical charac...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 194; no. 11; pp. 4233 - 4250
Autor principal: Allen, Colin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2017
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=126215329&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 126215329
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Nov2017
      vid: 194
      iid: 11
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        126215329
        10.1007/s11229-017-1454-4
      ppf: 4233
      ppct: 17
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 444KB
      tig:
        atl: On (not) defining cognition.
      aug:
        au: Allen, Colin
      su:
        Cognition
        Pluralism
        Philosophers
        Scientists
        Cognitive science
      sug:
        subj:
          Cognition
          Pluralism
          Philosophers
          Scientists
          Cognitive science
      keyword:
        Animals
        Definition
        Extended mind
        Group cognition
      ab: Should cognitive scientists be any more embarrassed about their lack of a discipline-fixing definition of cognition than biologists are about their inability to define 'life'? My answer is 'no'. Philosophers seeking a unique 'mark of the cognitive' or less onerous but nevertheless categorical characterizations of cognition are working at a level of analysis upon which hangs nothing that either cognitive scientists or philosophers of cognitive science should care about. In contrast, I advocate a pluralistic stance towards uses of the term 'cognition' that eschews the urge to treat cognition as a metaphysically well-defined 'natural' kind.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2017. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2017
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N