Counter-cyclical Voting in the United Kingdom.

By extending the time-tested reward–punishment hypothesis in economic voting, this article argues that rational voters hold incumbents accountable for the macroeconomic policies they pursue rather than purely for the economic climate that prevails under their tenure. Building on this premise, I firs...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Political Studies Vol. 65; no. 4; pp. 1040 - 1059
Autor principal:	Bojar, Abel
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Sage Publications Inc. Dec2017
Materias:	United Kingdom Voting Unemployment Elections Labor market History Economic voting Voter attitudes Macroeconomics > Government policy British history British politics & government
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost