Counter-cyclical Voting in the United Kingdom.
By extending the time-tested reward–punishment hypothesis in economic voting, this article argues that rational voters hold incumbents accountable for the macroeconomic policies they pursue rather than purely for the economic climate that prevails under their tenure. Building on this premise, I firs...
| Publicado en: | Political Studies Vol. 65; no. 4; pp. 1040 - 1059 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
Dec2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=126378115&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 126378115 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00323217 PSZ jtl: Political Studies issn: 00323217 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2017 vid: 65 iid: 4 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 126378115 10.1177/0032321717702399 ppf: 1040 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 126378115 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 126378115 tig: atl: Counter-cyclical Voting in the United Kingdom. aug: au: Bojar, Abel affil: European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK su: United Kingdom Voting Unemployment Elections Labor market History Economic voting Voter attitudes Macroeconomics -- Government policy British history British politics & government sug: subj: Voting Unemployment Elections Labor market History United Kingdom Economic voting Voter attitudes Macroeconomics -- Government policy British history British politics & government keyword: economic voting elections fiscal policy median voter vote intention economic voting elections fiscal policy median voter vote intention ab: By extending the time-tested reward–punishment hypothesis in economic voting, this article argues that rational voters hold incumbents accountable for the macroeconomic policies they pursue rather than purely for the economic climate that prevails under their tenure. Building on this premise, I first put forward a theory where business cycle fluctuations realign relative fiscal preferences among income groups. This theory’s implications predict that the aggregate electoral response to fiscal decisions evolves in a counter-cyclical fashion. Using quarterly measures of vote intention shares of incumbent parties in the United Kingdom, I provide time-series evidence from a set of error correction models supporting this proposition: at times of low unemployment, the electorate punishes profligate incumbents; in deteriorating labour market conditions, however, they reward expansionary policies. The immediate electoral impact is non-significant across the models, and most of the estimated effect is spread out across subsequent quarters. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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