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Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness-of-Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher-Order Representational Theories.

According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard...

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Published in:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 98; no. 4; pp. 555 - 576
Main Author: Picciuto, Vincent
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2017
Subjects:
Representation (Philosophy)
Argument
Theorists
Phenomenalism
Possibility
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness-of-Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher-Order Representational Theories.
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        au: Picciuto, Vincent
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama
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        Representation (Philosophy)
        Argument
        Theorists
        Phenomenalism
        Possibility
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          Representation (Philosophy)
          Argument
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          Phenomenalism
          Possibility
      ab: According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher-order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher-order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness-of-grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.
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